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TRADE POLICY, EXPORTS, AND DEVELOPMENT
This paper addresses the role of international trade policies of developed and
developing nations in promoting or retarding growth and development in Latin
America. The analysis focuses on three related issues. First, how important
is trade policy as a determinant of economic development prospects for Latin
America? Second, what are the consequences for Latin America of recent
changes in the world trading environment and proposals now before the in-
ternational community? Particular emphasis is given to three key develop-
ments: implementation of the Generalized System of Preferences, conclusion
of the Tokyo Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and emergence of
new protectionist pressures in the major industrial nations. Finally, given that
trade policies reflect forces that are as much political as economic, what are
the potential gains to Latin America from alternative strategies in future
negotiations?
Economic Development and Export Growth
Export growth now occupies a central position in the economic development
plans of most nations in Latin America. Import-substitution policies have grad-
ually given way to outward-looking development strategies, and expansion of
nontraditional exports is seen as a key to industrialization and sustained growth
of per capita income.
1 Sharply higher prices for imported fuel have generated
additional pressure for export expansion to meet current bills and to service
debt. Ironically, this new emphasis on exports comes at a time when prospects
for rapid export growth are clouded. The advanced nations, accounting for
about two-thirds of export earnings in Latin America, have been growing at
rates significantly below those of the 1950s and 1960s. This in turn has con-232 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
tributed to a reversal of the sustained postwar push toward free trade. Selective
market closure, implemented by voluntary export restraints, orderly marketing
agreements, and other nontariff barriers, affects an increasing proportion of
exports to the advanced nations. The new barriers are aimed particularly at
labor-intensive standardized manufactures, a major area of comparative ad-
vantage for the "newly industrializing" countries (NICS). In Latin America,
the nations most affected at present are Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, but
with Colombia, Uruguay, and others close behind them.
The switch from import-substituting industrialization toward more export-
oriented growth strategies obviously means an increased dependence upon
external conditions for success. The success of import substitution was limited
largely by internal factors — small domestic markets and inappropriate in-
centives. In contrast, a nation's ability to spur development via export promo-
tion depends crucially upon external as well as internal factors. Export-led
growth strategies are most likely to succeed in a trading environment char-
acterized by predictable access to expanding markets. For any individual coun-
try, and to a major extent even for Latin America as a whole, the world eco-
nomic environment must be regarded as exogenously determined. Prospects for
export-led development depend on the growth of present and potential markets
and of the share of Latin America in those markets. The major external factors
influencing Latin-America's export prospects can be grouped under three head-
ings: long-term growth rates in present and potential export markets, growth
of competing exports from other sources, and trends in market access as deter-
mined by trade policy developments.
Although this paper emphasizes the role of trade policy, it should be under-
scored that trade policy cannot be regarded as an independent influence on
the export prospects of Latin America. Low growth rates and poor structural
adjustment in the importing countries often provide the rationale for erection
of new trade barriers or slower elimination of existing ones. Furthermore, the
success of export-oriented development in some nations has two important but
opposing consequences for the future export prospects of others. Rapid pene-
tration of particular "sensitive" industries by the Asian NICs (and, earlier, by
Japan) has already triggered import-relief action by the United States and
the European Community (EC). The ability of nations in Latin America to
export textiles, clothing, shoes, and consumer electronics to the US and EC
has thus been undermined by the past successes of other NICs; the impact of
current Brazilian and Mexican exports may similarly retard future export
growth of other nations in Latin America that are less far along in the process
of industrialization. On the other hand, rapid income growth in the NICs also
means the opening of important new potential export markets. The recent
evolution of regional trade patterns provides supporting evidence for both
relationships.GAINS FROM LIBERALIZATION 233
While market access is obviously one necessary condition for successful ex-
port-led development, it is not the only consideration, nor even the most im-
portant. This is evident from the widely differing rates of export and GNP
growth experienced by the nations of Latin America in recent decades. What-
ever the trading environment, a nation's ability to exploit available opportuni-
ties is determined mainly by internal factors. Increased export opportunities
cannot substitute for adequate primary and intermediate inputs, human and
physical capital, or technological and managerial know-how. And in many less
developed countries (LDCs), national economic policies are themselves a major
obstacle to efficient utilization of available resources.
For Latin America as a whole, the most important single determinant of year-
to-year changes in export earnings is the business cycle of the industrial nations.
But, this relationship must be viewed in proper perspective. The industrial na-
tions are unlikely to shape their macroeconomic policies according to potential
trade benefits to exporters in Latin America. However, there is no conflict
between the goals of policymakers in the advanced industrial nations and those
of exporters in Latin America — the rapid and steady growth desired by the
industrial nations also benefits exporters serving those markets. Trade policy de-
cisions, in contrast, represent a trade-off between benefits to domestic producing
interests on one hand and to domestic consumers and foreign suppliers on the
other. Thus, trade policy represents a major area in which advanced nations'
policy choices can be of vital interest to Latin America, but also one in which
policymakers consciously weigh LDG growth and development prospects
against perceived domestic short-run political and economic costs of import
penetration.
2
Even if trade barriers are far down on the list of factors determining the
prospects for export-led development, they do have a measurable impact. Evi-
dence from the Kennedy Round suggests that LDC exporters of manufactured
goods do respond to marginal profitability changes resulting from most-favored-
nation (MFN) tariff reductions, and that their response is in fact as great as
that of their counterparts in the industrial world [8]. It is also worth noting that,
unlike most recent proposals for restructuring the world economy to promote
the interests of the developing nations, reduction of trade barriers provides a
possibility of mutual gain, at least in the longer run.
3
Past and Future Markets for Exports from Latin America
The importance of trade liberalization in facilitating export growth and
diversification should be examined in the context of recent export performance
in Latin America. Data on the sources, destinations, and commodity composi-
tion of exports from Latin America yield useful information of three types.
First, current trade linkages indicate the magnitude of potential gains from
improved terms on existing trade and also imply the existence of communica-234 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
tions, marketing, and transport networks that increase short-run responsiveness
of exporters and importers to changing trade incentives. Second, trends in
export performance provide evidence concerning the importance of MFN
tariff reductions and the GSP relative to other major factors influencing ex-
port prospects. Finally, long-term market share trends reflect overall economic
and political forces promoting or retarding trade with any given export market.
Sources
Aggregate statements about regional export trends are often statements about
the export performance of just a few major nations that dominate the totals.
Brazil, the world's fifth largest nation in land area and the seventh largest in
population, alone accounts for nearly one-fifth of total exports from Latin
America and a still larger share, about one-third, of total manufactured ex-
ports.
4 In the export of manufactures, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina together
supply nearly half of the total. For primary commodities, Venezuela is the top
exporter in Latin America; its revenues, almost entirely from petroleum exports,
generate more than one-fifth the regional total. Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina,
and Mexico together account for about half of total primary exports from the
region. Each remaining nation accounts for only a small fraction of aggregate
regional earnings from primary exports, although some are important sources of
individual primary exports, as in the case of Bolivia (tin), Chile (copper),
Colombia (coffee), Ecuador (bananas), and Jamaica (bauxite). Thus, aggre-
gate trade data — and inferences from them — must be interpreted with care,
taking into account the diversity among nations in terms of size, resource base,
and level of development.
Composition
Aggregate trade statistics for recent decades reflect the rapid expansion of
industrial output in the region and an even more rapid rise in the share of
industrial products in total exports. For individual nations, the share of man-
ufactures in total exports now varies from less than 5 percent in Venezuela,
Bolivia, and Ecuador, to about 30 percent for Mexico and Uruguay (see Table
1). While Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina have made the most substantial gains
in expanding industrial production, countries such as El Salvador, Dominican
Republic, Peru, Colombia, Guatemala, and Uruguay all recorded more than
15 percent average annual growth of manufactured exports from 1973 to
1976.
6
Although growth of nontraditional exports, mainly manufactures, is a goal of
every nation in Latin America, primary exports still generate about four-fifths
of total foreign exchange earnings for the region. Table 2 indicates major
primary exports by country for members of the Latin-American Free Trade
Association (LAFTA). Tropical products including coffee, sugar, and cottonGAINS FROM LIBERALIZATION 235
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Sources: Export values, UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, July 1979; percentage shares (except
where indicated otherwise), World Development Report, 1979. Shares labeled
a estimated using data
from World Development Report, 1978 and International Financial Statistics, December 1979.
«
are each supplied by a number of nations; however, Argentina is the only
country in Latin America exporting a broad range of temperate-zone agricul-




In terms of current export levels, three markets dominate the aggregate trade
statistics: the US, accounting for nearly one-third of total exports, the EG, more
than one-fifth of the total, and intraregional trade, also about one-fifth (see
Table 3). The breakdown of aggregate shares by commodity class, shown in
Table 4 for LAFTA members, reveals important compositional differences
across export markets. Food exports dominate sales to Soviet Bloc nations. In
contrast, manufactured goods make up about half of total sales within Latin
America and close to half of intra-LAFTA exports. The share of manufactures
in exports to the EG, US, and Japanese markets is about one-fifth.
Tables 3 and 5 show trends in export shares by major market for LAFTA
and for Latin America as a whole. For total exports (Table 3), the EC and
US markets have been declining in relative importance, while intraregional
trade has increased substantially. These trends are even more striking when
exports are disaggregated. As Table 5 indicates, the decline in the relative im-
portance of the US market for manufactured exports and the concomitant in-
crease in intraregional trade in manufactures have been dramatic. Although
the shares of OPEC and the Soviet Bloc are still small, Table 3 indicates rapid236 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
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Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial
Statistics, December 1979.GAINS FROM LIBERALIZATION 237
Table 3
LATIN-AMERICAN EXPORTS TO SELECTED DESTINATIONS, 1963-78






























































Sources: For 1963, UN Statistical Yearbook, 1974; For 1973, UN Statis-
tical Yearbook, 1977; For 1978, UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, June
1979.
a"Total" data include the Caribbean.
Table 4
LATIN-AMERICAN EXPORTS BY COMMODITY CLASS AND DESTINATION, 1977

















































































































































































Manufactured goods 5-8 8,832 1,910 2,000 394 3,133 2,624 685
Source: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, May 1979.
Data are for LAFTA members.238 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Table 5
LATIN-AMERICAN MANUFACTURED EXPORTS BY SELECTED

















































Source: United Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Sta-
tistics, July 1972 and May 1979.
expansion of exports to these nontraditional markets. In contrast, sales to the
Japanese market have shown only modest aggregate growth, despite Japan's
high rate of GNP growth over the period.
Similar shifts are evident in the LAFTA share in total imports from all
LDC sources
7 for major Latin-American export markets (Table 6). LAFTA
members have supplied a declining share of total EG and US imports from all
LDCs, both for total trade and for manufactures. Likewise, LAFTA products
have accounted for a declining fraction of the region's own primary imports, in
part reflecting the growing importance of fuel imports in the total. But in the
case of manufactures, the percentage of total imports from all LDCs that are
supplied by LAFTA members has increased, both for LAFTA and for Latin
America as a whole.
These export trends shed some light on the relative importance of recent
trade policy developments. The much discussed increase in US and EG pro-
tectionism is consistent with the declining importance of these markets for
exporters in Latin America. However, the new barriers are aimed especially at
the fast growing exports of the Asian NICs. The shrinking share of LAFTA
in total manufactured imports from all LDCs indicates that other LDC suppliers
are increasing their penetration of the protected markets more rapidly than
producers in Latin America have been able to do. Thus, the usual dimensions
of export competitiveness, rather than exclusion by nontariff barriers, appears
to be the major factor.
Another potential influence on sales of manufactures in the US and EC
markets is the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP). Under the GSP,
manufactured exports from Latin America and other developing areas are ac-
corded preferential access to the protected markets of the industrial nations.
8
The EG plan went into effect in 1971, while that of the US was not imple-GAINS FROM LIBERALIZATION 239
Table 6
LAFTA SHARES IN SELECTED EXPORT MARKETS (percent of









































Sources:united Nations, Monthly Bulletin of Sta-
tistics, July 1975 and May 1979.
merited until 1976. This delay may have contributed to a relative expansion of
exports to the European Community, at least partly reflecting diversion of some
exports from US markets. The EC share in manufactured exports from Latin
America increased through 1976, but declined from 1976 to 1977; the US
share in manufactured exports showed a declining trend up through 1975,
with a reversal that coincides with the implementation of the US GSP scheme.
However, a more likely explanation of these movements lies in the timing of
the mid-1970s recession in the EC and US. And, as Table 6 indicates, the
region's exporters continued to lose ground in both markets to other LDC sup-
pliers after the GSP went into effect.
The rapid growth of LAFTA sales of manufacturers within Latin America
may result in part from existing preferential ties. However, if LAFTA prefer-
ential access has had an appreciable impact on aggregate trading patterns, it
appears to be reflected in the level of the market share, rather than its rate of
growth; manufactured exports from LAFTA to the rest of Latin America
have been growing even faster than intra-LAFTA trade. Rapid growth of the
region, rather than LAFTA trade policies, has probably been the major factor
accounting for the increasing importance of intraregional trade in manufactures.
In contrast to a modest increase in the relative importance of the EC market
for the region's manufactures, primary exports to the EC dropped sharply from
more than one-third of the LAFTA total in 1973 to less than one-fifth in 1974,
with the share remaining close to one-fifth since then.
9 One major reason for the
sharp drop is that the EC accounts for only a small fraction of petroleum ex-
ports from Latin America. When the price of petroleum exports soared in
1974 and thereafter, the EC share in the value of total primary export earnings
automatically declined. However, exports to the EC in other categories also
fell in relative, and sometimes absolute, terms.240 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
A factor potentially influencing nonfuel primary exports to the EC is the
preferential treatment accorded by the EG to more than 50 African, Caribbean,
and Pacific (ACP) developing nations. Under the Lome Convention, signed in
1975 and renewed in 1978, the ACP countries receive free access to the EC
market for most exports.
1
0 Although the ACP nations are among the world's
poorest and least-developed, they compete with Latin America in the markets
for a number of agricultural primary commodities, especially tropical products
such as coffee, cocoa, bananas, and cotton. However, the EC share in total
LAFTA primary exports has tended to rise since 1975, so that the immediate
impact of Lome-induced trade diversion appears to be slight. For example, in
SITC 0-1, which includes all tropical food products, the share of the EC in
total exports fell from 1973 to 1975, but has been rising subsequently. The
LAFTA share in total EC imports of SITC 0-1 products from all LDC
sources follows a similar time pattern. This suggests that factors such as the
business cycle in the EC and price movements for individual exports are more
important than Lome preferences as determinants of the share trends.
Export markets may be considered important on the basis of current size or
potential for growth. About two-thirds of the region's export earnings still come
from trade with the industrial nations, their traditional partners. In terms of
growth potential, however, other markets show greater promise. Extrapolation
of recent trends suggests two generalizations concerning future export growth.
First, the most promising market for the region's manufactured exports appears
to be Latin America itself. Already approaching the importance of the US and
EC market combined, the Latin market is growing much more rapidly and is
far less likely to be affected in the near future by proliferation of new trade
barriers. Second, the most promising markets for the region's primary exports
are the nations of the Soviet Bloc and OPEC. Although current sales to these
markets are still small, rapid growth of demand is likely, particularly for food
imports, as supply diversification becomes an increasing concern. This does not
mean that the US and EC markets for manufactures or primary commodities
will necessarily decline in absolute size. Rather, it is likely that if rapid export
growth is achieved, it will be in these newer, nontraditional directions.
Efforts by Latin America to improve export prospects have been directed at
least as much toward the markets of the past as those of the future. Because
trade with traditional partners still generates most export earnings, even modest
terms of trade improvements can yield sizable aggregate benefits. With respect
to intra-Latin trade, Latin America has been in the forefront of LDC efforts
to achieve benefits through economic integration, but evidence from the statis-
tics suggests that these efforts have had no important aggregate impact so far.
1
1
And while food sales to the Soviet Bloc and OPEC may constitute an increas-
ingly important source of export earnings for a few nations, the major deter-
minants of such trade are more political than economic, and thus involve de-
cisions lying outside the usual sphere of international trade policy options.GAINS FROM LIBERALIZATION 241
PREFERENTIAL AND MFN LIBERALIZATION: CONSEQUENCES FOR LATIN AMERICA
Individually, as a regional bloc, and within the "Group of 77," the nations
of Latin America have been at the forefront of efforts to improve LDC market
access, particularly through liberalization of existing tariff and nontariff barriers
of the advanced nations. The most important single trade liberalization issue for
Latin America has been establishment of the GSP, the top item on the agenda
of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) for
more than a decade. The GSP had significance not only for whatever direct
benefits it might provide, but also as the first major step in establishing the
broader principle of systematic preferential treatment of LDCs within the in-
ternational economy. Acceptance of the GSP by the advanced industrial na-
tions signaled their willingness to move away from one central tenet of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), MFN treatment, that is,
nondiscriminatory trade, among GATT members.
1
2
The Tokyo Round negotiators took a further step in this direction by institu-
tionalizing the preferential treatment of developing nations within the GATT.
However, along with official GATT acceptance of the principle of discrimina-
tion favoring LDCs came the explicit proviso that, for any given nation, prefer-
ential status is inherently temporary and conditional in nature. Specifically, each
LDC will be expected gradually to relinquish its preferred status and to assume
more of the full responsibilities under the GATT rules as that nation's develop-
ment objectives are met. Conditionality of preferred treatment, now referred
to as the "graduation" issue, is of particular importance for Latin America, be-
cause major nations in the region are among the most advanced LDCs in terms
of industrial development or per capita income.
The trade prospects of nations in Latin America have been altered by recent
broad changes in market access, on a preferential basis through implementation
of the GSP, and on a nondiscriminatory basis through completion of the Tokyo
Round. The consequences for Latin America of these major developments are
interdependent. In the near future, MFN tariff reductions negotiated in the
Tokyo Round will, as they are phased in, reduce the margin of preference cur-
rently enjoyed by eligible nations under the GSP. In the longer run, some
countries are likely to be among the first LDCs faced with graduation from
preferred status, including eligibility for the GSP. This will mean not only
competition on equal
1
3 rather than preferential terms with other, mainly de-
veloped, exporters to the protected markets of the advanced nations, but also
competition on unequal, that is, nonpreferential, terms with exporters in LDCs
not yet far enough along in development to be graduated.
Latin-American Benefits Under the GSP
While the GSP is likely to increase LDC earnings from existing exports,
1
4
its major rationale lies in an infant-industry argument applied to LDC manu-242 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
factoring as a whole. By providing export subsidies on a wide range of LDG
manufactures, the GSP should set in motion "dynamic" forces that will propel
emerging producers into eventual international competitiveness. Whatever the
theoretical merits, actual export-stimulating benefits to Latin America from
the various GSP schemes now in effect have been modest. The GSP plan most
important to Latin America is that of the US, with estimated gross trade crea-
tion of about $175 million in 1978. Trade benefits to Latin America from the
other major GSP arrangements, those of the EC and Japan, are estimated to be
of the order of magnitude of $32 million and $48 million, respectively, for 1976
[17].
These trade creation figures indicate only how successful the GSP has been
in its primary objective of stimulating industrial exports; dynamic benefits
resulting from such factors as increased competition, scale economies, learning-
by-doing, and more efficient investment patterns are presumably proportional
to the induced increase in trade. However, the GSP may also yield static bene-
fits. To calculate static benefits, earnings from export expansion should be
reduced by the alternative social cost of resources required to generate the
additional exports. On the other hand, static benefits also include any increase
in prices received for exports that would have occurred even in the absence of
preferential market access. Where MFN tariff rates are high and exporters can
capture most of the difference between domestic and world prices, static bene-
fits may be substantial. This depends crucially upon the devices used to limit
LDC preferential access to particular markets. The structure of some plans,
particularly that of the EC, tends to reduce the bargaining power of LDC sup-
pliers on GSP exports and thus to reduce this potential source of benefits.
GSP has had a relatively minor impact on industrial exports from Latin
America. In part, this is because the major plans are far from "generalized"
in the preferential access accorded. Restrictions on eligibility of countries and
of commodities greatly reduce the potential gains. In the case of the United
States, three aspects of the GSP rules have limited benefits to Latin America:
"competitive need" exclusions, exclusions of import-sensitive manufactures, and
exclusion of all OPEC members.
Competitive need exclusions severely limit imports from major LDC sup-
pliers of particular commodities, regardless of overall development status. If
a country supplies more than 50 percent of total US imports of an eligible item
or a quantity per year valued in excess of an annually adjusted dollar limit,
the country becomes ineligible for preferential access for that item. This pro-
vision is intended in part to reserve preferential treatment for exports in which
beneficiary nations have not already established significant productive capacity.
In absolute terms, the competitive need restrictions affect primarily the most
developed of the LDCs — the same countries also derive the largest absolute
benefits from the program. However, when the impact of competitive need ex-GAINS FROM LIBERALIZATION 243
elusions is expressed as a proportion of otherwise eligible exports, even the poor-
est Latin-American nations show substantial reduction of total GSP benefits.
In fact, the proportions tend to be larger for the less industrialized among the
group, because their manufacturing sectors have not yet become diversified. For
Latin America as a whole, GSP products exported to the US in 1978 were
valued at about $3.5 billion. However, only about $1.5 billion of that trade was
actually eligible for duty-free treatment [17].
The US preference scheme also excludes from eligibility all import-sensitive
items subject to relief actions. These include textiles and apparel, shoes, watches,
bicycles, tires, and some iron and steel products. In effect, precisely those labor-
intensive manufactures in which the LDCs as a group have already achieved
considerable market penetration even without the aid of preferential access,
that is, those in which they have the greatest demonstrated comparative ad-
vantage,
1
5 are explicitly denied preferential treatment. The most important
instance is textiles, where US tariff and nontariff protection remains much
greater than for any other manufacturing industry. The effect of such exclu-
sions is to encourage production only of goods in which developing nations
have not demonstrated an advantage over industrial country producers. Thus,
one longer-run effect of the GSP could be to promote a relatively inefficient
international division of labor.
1
6
In Latin America, Brazil and Mexico are most affected currently by the
exclusion of import-sensitive manufactures. However, over the life of the US
plan (until 1986, unless renewed), the exclusion of the very items that have in
the past been the major stepping stones in the route to industrialization also
makes the program far less valuable to those countries just beginning to
establish manufacturing capacity. In effect, the tried-and-true routes for LDC
industrial export diversification are now doubly blocked, by increasing pro-
tectionism in the importing countries and by the established and maintained
market shares of the NICs.
Under the Trade Act of 1974, OPEC members (along with most Com-
munist-bloc countries) were excluded from US preferences. In Latin America,
the countries thus eliminated were Venezuela and Ecuador. Although the po-
tential benefits from GSP were minor for these nations, their exclusion had
considerable symbolic and political significance, particularly in light of Latin-
American sensitivity on issues of national sovereignty in dealings with the US.
The 1979 Trade Agreements Act paved the way for inclusion of these nations
by leaving determination to the US President; both have now been added to
the list of GSP beneficiaries.
Results of the Tokyo Round
The Tokyo Round of multilateral trade negotiations reached a formal
conclusion in 1979. Despite (or possibly because of) the ominous world eco-244 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
nomic conditions, negotiators achieved major agreements in three areas: MFN
tariff reductions, "codes of conduct" governing nontariff barriers to trade, and
changes in the structure of the GATT itself. Each set of outcomes has impor-
tant implications for the trade prospects of Latin America. However, recalling
that the Tokyo Round commenced with an explicit promise of special and more
favorable treatment of the developing nations, potential gains to Latin America
may seem modest indeed.
MFN Tariff Reductions
Previous rounds of negotiations had already achieved major reductions of
MFN tariff rates, so that further across-the-board tariff cuts assumed a low
priority. Under pressure from the EC, negotiated cuts were somewhat larger
for above-average duties, to bring these into line with overall levels of tariff pro-
tection— a "harmonization" approach. For industrial products, the average
reduction was about 13 percent for the US, 27 percent for the EG, 28 percent
for Japan, and 34 percent for Canada (Wall Street Journal, 22 June 1979).
However, because most tariff rates were already quite low, these percentage
cuts represent only minor changes in the degree of protection afforded domestic
suppliers. Even so, LDC representatives expressed fears that trade benefits
gained under the GSP would be seriously eroded.
MFN tariff reductions have two effects on the value of LDC exports. As
stressed by the LDCs, MFN tariff reductions shrink the margin of preference
for goods eligible for GSP treatment.
1
7 However, these goods account for a
small fraction of total LDC exports even for the product categories included in
GSP plans. In the case of exports from Latin America to the US, only 22
percent fall into product classifications covered by the GSP [17]. Of that frac-
tion, less than half is actually accorded duty-free treatment under the GSP,
with most of the rest eliminated by the competitive need provisions of the US
plan. In contrast, any MFN tariff reduction would apply to all imports within
a given product classification. Thus, MFN tariff cuts might on net encourage
exports from Latin America to the US even for those products falling under
the GSP. Also, the GSP is aimed at manufactured goods. MFN tariff reductions
on primary commodities would yield unambiguous trade benefits to Latin
America; in fact, tariff reductions for tropical products constituted one area of
major concern for the negotiators-
Empirical estimates prepared by the Organization of American States
(OAS) Secretariat suggest that new trade created by MFN tariff reductions
could substantially outweigh trade loss resulting from GSP erosion.
1
8 However,
the aggregate estimates mask important distributional consequences within Latin
America. The OAS prediction of a net increase in the value of total regional
exports to the US (1978 US dollars) of about $20 million is the net of a sub-
stantial gain for Mexico (more than $30 million), smaller dollar gains for aGAINS FROM LIBERALIZATION 245
number of nations mainly in the Caribbean and Central America, and losses of
various proportions for most LAFTA countries. The largest dollar loss is pre-
dicted for Brazil, an export reduction of about $8 million, and only a slightly
smaller loss for Argentina.
1
9 The MFN tariff reductions thus do appear to
hurt export prospects for some nations of Latin America.
2
0 While this does not
constitute an argument against MFN tariff reductions, the Tokyo Round com-
mitment to special and more favorable treatment for developing nations sug-
gests that offsetting action, such as expanded GSP coverage or further MFN
tariff cuts might be appropriate. However, the US has argued that the GSP and
the MTN should be two entirely separate matters.
Codes of Conduct
Potentially the most far-reaching outcome of the Tokyo Round was the
formulation of codes governing nontariff barriers to trade. While hailed by
some as a major step toward freer trade, the codes gained strong support from
US industries concerned with the elimination of abuses (real or imagined)
perpetrated by their foreign competitors [2]. It is significant that the price
paid by the Carter Administration for congressional approval of the Tokyo
Round pact included a major reorganization of the administrative apparatus
for implementing US trade policy in areas covered by the codes. In particular,
authority to administer countervailing duties was shifted from the relatively
free-trade-oriented Treasury Department to the Commerce Department.
Codes have been successfully concluded for five major categories of non-
tariff trade distortions: customs valuation, government procurement, import
licensing, subsidies and countervailing duties, and standards and technical
regulation. The codes explicitly recognize that government actions taken in
pursuit of legitimate domestic objectives may have important effects on trade
and that policies adopted for primarily domestic reasons may be administered
in a manner discriminatory to foreign suppliers. All the codes provide for
special and more favorable treatment of developing nations.
Of the five codes concluded, most important to Latin America and other
developing regions is that regulating the use of subsidies and countervailing
duties. Developed countries signing the code agree to refrain from most types
of export subsidies as well as domestic subsidies having a substantial impact
on trade. LDCs, however, are permitted to use direct export subsidies as part
of their overall development programs, with the provision that such subsidies
should be phased out as international competitiveness is achieved. These rules
essentially describe the status quo. With regard to countervailing duties applied
by importing nations, rules are more lenient for subsidized LDC exports. Most
important, a formal test of injury to the importer is required before a subsidy
can be countervailed.246 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
For nations in Latin America that use export subsidies to promote industrial
growth, this preferential treatment may be a significant benefit. Under the
1979 Trade Agreements Act, the US can afford more lenient countervailing-
duty treatment (that is, conditional upon a test of material injury to the im-
port-competing industry) only to LDCs that have signed the code. However,
by signing, more advanced LDCs become obligated to an eventual phaseout
of subsidies. As of January 1980, only Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay
2
1 had signed
the subsidies code, although others were expected to do so.
Negotiators have not successfully concluded a code of conduct for the class
of nontariff barriers of greatest concern to LDC exporters — safeguards against
disruptive imports. Formulation of such a code would be of great potential
significance to all areas experiencing rapid industrial development. The very
high growth rates of some categories of LDC exports have frequently triggered
"temporary" protective action by affecting importing industries. This pattern
is likely to become even more pronounced as LDCs in Latin America and else-
where continue to increase the share of manufactures in their exports.
LDCs complain that the industrialized nations use safeguard measures to
afford essentially perpetual protection to domestic industries that have lost
their international competitiveness. The safeguards code would have ensured
the temporary character of safeguard protection. In addition, the code would
have required special consideration for LDC exporters potentially affected, as
well as compensation for resulting losses. LDCs also sought, unsuccessfully, a
commitment on the part of industrialized nations to shift resources out of in-
dustries in which LDCs have achieved a clear comparative advantage. In light
of the political sensitivity of the issues involved, it is hardly surprising that no
agreement was reached by the negotiators, and it seems unlikely that a broad
code of safeguards can be concluded in the near future [12].
The Enabling Clause
In addition to a provision for special and differential treatment of develop-
ing countries in each of the codes, a major action taken in the Tokyo Round
was to alter formally the structure of the GATT to incorporate a permanent
exemption to the most-favored-nation principle by explicitly permitting prefer-
ential treatment of LDCs in a number of broad respects. In 1968, a waiver of
the GATT rules was required to permit introduction of the Generalized System
of Preferences, and, similarly, trade preferences granted by LDCs to one another
have been treated as specific and limited exceptions to the principle of non-
discrimination. Under the "enabling clause," GATT members may provide spe-
cial and more favorable treatment of developing countries in such areas as
tariffs, nontariff barriers, regional or global arrangements among developing
countries, and special treatment for least developed countries. However, the
United States successfully pressed for a link between special treatment of LDCs
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according to their progress in development. The "graduation" of developing
nations to fuller GATT responsibilities is thus expected as their development
and trade situation permit.
POTENTIAL GAINS TO LATIN AMERICA FROM FUTURE LIBERALIZATION
Now that the advanced nations have explicitly provided for special and more
favorable treatment of LDCs within the GATT framework, what are the
logical "next steps" in trade liberalization efforts? By institutionalizing prefer-
ential treatment of developing areas, the members of the GATT may appear to
have abandoned the goal of most-favored-nation treatment, permitting and
even encouraging the evolution of a permanent two-tier trading system. How-
ever, explicit inclusion of the graduation principle, conveying the temporary
and conditional nature of favorable treatment afforded LDCs, indicates that
GATT members were concerned to avoid this outcome. Furthermore, prefer-
ential treatment of developing nations in world trade is not the same thing
as (and indeed does not require, even temporarily) a two-tier system of dis-
criminatory access.
An alternative approach to implementation of preferential treatment is
targeted MFN trade reform, that is, elimination on a nondiscriminatory basis
of existing barriers particularly detrimental to the growth of present and po-
tential LDG exports. In practice, targeted MFN liberalization would mean
reductions of barriers mainly in areas that already pose major problems of in-
dustrial adjustment in the advanced nations. It is therefore unlikely that this
approach will be adopted unilaterally. However, nations in Latin America can
crucially affect prospects for targeted liberalization through their own future
trade policy choices.
Preferential Treatment Within MFN Liberalization
Targeted elimination of barriers on an MFN basis has several important
advantages over a system of two-tier market access. First, it is consistent with
the fundamental economic rationale underlying the multilateral trade negotia-
tions. In contrast to preferential trading, there is no efficiency loss from trade
diversion.
2
2 Also, because improved market access is on an MFN basis, the
targeting approach does not have the disadvantage of creating a pressure group
of beneficiary nations opposed to future MFN liberalization. Finally, and of
particular significance for Latin America, targeted liberalization does not
penalize successful development with the prospect of eventual exclusion.
In making their plea for preferential access, LDG exporters argue that, in
light of their less-developed status, they should not be expected to compete on
equal terms with their counterparts in the industrial nations. However, there
are obviously quite a few industries in which LDC comparative advantage is
well established, and a growing number of developing countries able to com-248 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
pete over a broad range of industrial activities. In any case, the new subsidy
and countervailing duty code agreed upon by the Tokyo Round participants
explicitly allows individual developing countries considerable leeway to use
export subsidies, which have the same potential effect on competitive margins
as tariff preferences. But reliance on export subsidies would leave up to the in-
dividual exporting nations, rather than to potential importers, the designation
of those sectors for which a valid infant-industry case can be made, as well
as the implementation of temporary assistance in appropriate form and
amount.
2
3 Because subsidies have a direct impact on the finances of the ex-
porting countries, there is also a strong incentive to identify with some precision
the time when a former infant industry has become a sturdy adolescent.
2
4 The
threat of countervailing duties levied by importers provides an additional ex-
ternal constraint on the longevity of export subsidies.
Textiles
The most important industrial way-station on the route to economic develop-
ment, textile production has figured prominently in almost every success story
of export-led LDC growth. In most cases, classical comparative advantage
resting upon ample supplies of cheap labor has been amplified by government
assistance. As a reflection of the many success stories, the textile industry has
become a depressed sector and a political problem in almost every OECD
nation. Even Japan, itself quite recently the primary source of disruptive textile
exports to the US and EC, has now lost its comparative advantage to newer
producers.
Unwilling to cope with the domestic consequences of rapidly shifting inter-
national competitiveness, the industrial nations have protected their own
markets with high tariffs and international agreements to restrict exports. Al-
though Asian suppliers have been the major factor behind the advanced na-
tions' seemingly insoluble adjustment problem, all major LDC exporters, in-
cluding a number in Latin America, have been faced with pressure to limit
exports; most are now covered by agreements with the importing nations.
The importance of textiles to LDG trade prospects is difficult to exaggerate.
LDC benefits from trade liberalization on textiles alone would be almost as
large as those from comparable liberalization of all other trade combined.
2
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On the other hand, the exclusion of textiles from recent across-the-board MFN
tariff reductions and the proliferation of nontariff protection indicate the very
minimal likelihood of liberalization targeted to this sector unless importers
experience unexpected and dramatic progress in coping with internal struc-
tural adjustment.
Because of the perceived importance of textile production in the develop-
ment process, a proposal has been made to improve market access for the
poorest and least developed nations within the structure of the Multi-FibreGAINS FROM LIBERALIZATION 249
Agreement — in effect creating a three-tier trading system. In this way, pro-
ponents say, an important path of development, that is, production of labor-
intensive manufacturers for export, would be reopened to "countries that need
it most" (World Development Report, 1979). While the condition of the
least developed nations deserves special concern, this proposal would extend to
the internal trading system the middle-income squeeze that has become a
familiar feature of social welfare systems in many of the advanced nations;
the so-called "middle-income" LCDs, with per capita incomes still far below
those of the advanced nations, would pay much of the price of continued high
levels of protection for producers in the advanced nations. The remainder of
the cost, of course, is borne by consumers "protected" from low-cost textile
products.
Still, the adjustment problem in textiles is a particularly difficult one, both
politically and in terms of equity. In sharp contrast to the cases of steel and
autos, textile workers in the industrial nations are near the bottom of the income
scale even when employed. Furthermore, because these tend to be older workers,
unskilled, and disproportionately female or minority group members, the pros-
pects for adjustment (apart from early retirement) are poor. The case of tex-
tiles thus indicates both the large potential gains from future liberalization
targeted to the export interests of Latin America or of LDCs as a group and
the potential obstacles. The present trade predicament in textiles may soon be
reproduced for other labor-intensive manufactures.
Processing of Primary Commodities
Expansion of raw-material processing in producing nations remains a high
priority issue for UNCTAD and is included among the objectives of the
"Integrated Program for Commodities."
2
6 In the issue of processing, the pro-
ducing nations' desire for higher foreign-exchange earnings from primary ex-
ports is reinforced by the potential role processing activities can play in achiev-
ing longer-run objectives of industrialization and export diversification.
Tariff escalation in the industrialized importing countries produces high
effective protection rates for processing activities and, therefore, strong incen-
tives for location of processing in the consuming nations, a point long stressed
by developing nations that export raw primary commodities. However, com-
parative advantage depends upon such diverse factors as costs of capital,
labor, and power, as well as technology, scale economies, and relative transport
costs for raw and processed forms. For many commodities, tariff escalation may
simply shift processing activities from one industrialized country to another.
Also, even where effective protection does inhibit the location of processing in
developing countries, this is largely offset by the producing countries' own
policies to encourage exports of processed rather than raw primary exports.
2
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Trade policies of both industrial and developing countries together imply250 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
at most a minor bias toward location of processing in consuming countries.
The major impact is to increase the final price to developed-country consumers
of processed goods and thus reduce total demand. Simultaneous removal of both
exporting and importing country distortions would have its primary effect on
the extent of LDG processing through expansion of total demand, with only
minor induced relocation of processing activities from industrial to developing
countries. The estimated impact on LDC export revenues is, nevertheless, ap-
preciable. According to one study, export revenues from agricultural primary
commodities would rise by about 11 percent — an amount comparable with
the trade effects of the GSP [13].
Offshore Assmmbly
In contrast with tariff escalation, the offshore assembly provisions (OAP) of
the US tariff code encourage location of certain assembly activities in coun-
tries with low labor costs. Items 806.30 and 807.00 of the US tariff code
provide special treatment for goods assembled abroad using US-produced com-
ponents. Imports of the assembled products into the US are assessed the ap-
plicable tariff rate, but only on the value added in the foreign operation. The
OAP thus reduce the protection afforded domestic assembly activities, while at
the same time improving the competitive position of US producers of relevant
components.
The effect of the OAP on LDC exports to the US is substantial. For Latin
America, the resulting increase in the value of exports to the US exceeds that
for the US GSP. Also, because the terms of access are less circumscribed, the
potential for future growth may be greater, especially for the more successful
exporters [9]. On the other hand, benefits are even more concentrated than
under the GSP. Mexico alone accounts for more than half of total trade bene-
fits worldwide — about $200 million in 1976 — reflecting the extensive develop-
ment of "border" industry. Brazil accounted for another $13 million of ex-
panded exports, Caribbean nations together about $24 million, with a total
of about $60 million for all Latin America except Mexico [5].
Interestingly, offshore assembly provisions are rarely mentioned in discussions
of LDC export prospects, despite the rather large size of total trade benefits
relative to other actual or proposed measures to encourage LDC export
expansion.
Agricultural Products
Although expansion of manufactured exports remains the paramont trade
policy goal in most of Latin America on account of its presumed dynamic
benefits in terms of industrial development, considerable static benefits could
be derived from liberalization of remaining barriers to trade in agricultural
primary commodities. A recent estimate of potential LDC benefits from liberal-
ization of agricultural trade suggests that Latin America would capture moreGAINS FROM LIBERALIZATION 251
than half of the resulting worldwide increase in export revenues [19]. For a
hypothetical 50 percent across-the-board reduction of tariff and quantifiable
nontariff barriers on most OECD agricultural imports from a sample of 57
developing countries (in Latin America including Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru), regional export earnings would rise by nearly
$1.7 billion, about 5 percent of total export earnings and almost 7 percent with
petroleum exports excluded from the total.
Aggregate gains from an across-the-board reduction would be largest for
Argentina and Brazil. However, because protection of domestic agriculture
remains a high priority in the advanced nations, the prospects of major liberal-
ization on an across-the-board basis are slender. Competing imports such as
wheat, meat, sugar, and wine would almost certainly be excluded from any
foreseeable liberalization scheme. Thus, the size and distribution of actual
benefits to Latin America would depend upon the size of the actual cuts. Table
2 indicates the importance of various agricultural primary commodities in total




In recent years, negotiations to liberalize trade have begun to include ser-
vices along with physical goods. Trade in "invisible" nonfactor services such
as shipping, travel, insurance, brokerage, and communications now constitutes
a large, rapidly growing, and highly protected area of international exchange.
For Latin America, total export earnings generated by nonfactor services is
about one-fifth that from physical exports; total value of nonfactor services
imported is about one-quarter that of physical imports. The comparable
figures for the OECD countries are about one-quarter for both exports and
imports, but with considerable variation around that average. The United
States is an important net exporter of nonfactor services [18].
Although trade in nonfactor services is to some extent impeded by straight-
forward taxes, nontariff barriers — in many cases, outright prohibition of market
access to foreign suppliers — are a much more important feature of overall
protection than is the case of goods. While UNCTAD has called upon the de-
veloped countries to eliminate their policies restricting trade in services, the
nations of Latin America themselves impose significant barriers in virtually
every area of trade in services. Because developing nations are likely to have
a comparative advantage in those services utilizing relatively unskilled labor —
for example, transport — while the US and other advanced nations have a clear
comparative advantage in those services utilizing highly skilled labor — for
example, financial services — there is potential for reciprocal elimination of
some barriers. Of course, the infant industry argument within Latin America
and the political problem of sensitive sectors in the industrial nations does,
just as in the case of trade in physical goods, circumscribe the mutual gains
easily achieved in this area.252 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
Policy Choices for Latin America
The foregoing discussion has stressed potential gains to Latin America from
MFN trade liberalization targeted to regional export interests. However, the
idea of giving priority in international negotiations to MFN reduction of trade
barriers especially affecting LDC exporters is hardly a new one. A major reason
for the present emphasis by developing nations on preferential access is that
the various rounds of trade negotiations have made little headway in cutting
MFN tariffs on goods of greatest interest to LDC exporters, and major markets
are now increasingly protected by nontariff as well as tariff barriers.
2
9 Although
the new codes agreed upon in the Tokyo Round may help to moderate this
trend, a dramatic reduction in the use of nontariff protection by the industrial
nations seems unlikely for the near future.
3
0
While the implications for LDC export prospects of increased protectionism
in the industrial nations have been widely discussed, much less has been said
about the developing countries' options with regard to influencing future trade
policy developments. Even if most LDC markets are still too small to permit
effective bargaining on an individual basis, Latin America as a whole repre-
sents an important and rapidly growing market for the exports of the industrial
nations, one hard to ignore in the bargaining process. From a somewhat differ-
ent perspective, future trade policy choices in Latin America could either pro-
mote adjustment in the US and other industrial nations by encouraging growth
of their exports to Latin America along lines of present comparative advan-
tage, or could aggravate current adjustment problems by closing off export
opportunities.
Reciprocity
Neither preferential access under the GSP nor targeted elimination of bar-
riers on an MFN basis has been a major factor determining the growth and
direction of exports from Latin America. In part, this is because trade policy is
rather far down on the list of the determinants of export growth. However, there
are certainly some trade barriers that do significantly limit current and poten-
tial export growth. Of these, the pervasive restraints on trade in textiles are
the most egregious example.
The failure of Latin America to achieve desired improvements in market
access is explained in part by the largely passive role LDCs have chosen to play
in past trade negotiations. In the GATT, LDCs have been allowed to benefit
from negotiated tariff reductions without making their own reciprocal conces-
sions. As a result, there has been little attempt to exercise the substantive col-
lective bargaining power of the developing nations as present and potential
importers. The active negotiators — the industrial nations — have quite natu-
rally concentrated their efforts on the barriers of greatest importance to them-
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Under the GATT rules, developed contracting parties do not expect rec-
iprocity for commitments made by them with regard to reducing barriers to
imports from developing countries. The original rationale for this exemption
was that high tariffs were required to protect infant industries and that, there-
fore, the LDCs had nothing to offer in return for concessions of the industrial
nations [7]. Now that import-substitution no longer dominates the industrializa-
tion strategies of the developing nations, this justification has become obsolete.
3
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Another reason developing nations have remained on the sidelines of past
negotiations is that they do not fit well into the reciprocal bargaining process
which has evolved within the GATT. Importers offering tariff concessions
typically negotiate with the principal supplier of the relevant product, rarely
a developing country. However, mutually profitable agreements could surely be
reached along different lines. The nations of Latin America have a long tra-
dition of combining forces to achieve desired economic ends, and the col-
lective importance of these nations as suppliers and as importers is considerable




One further objection raised with respect to including LDCs in the recipro-
cal bargaining process is that these nations are plagued with persistent balance
of payments problems, especially since 1973 for oil-importing nations. Import
restrictions are therefore required, it is argued, for balance of payments pur-
poses. Benefits to developed exporters from LDC reciprocal tariff reductions
would be mainly illusory, offset by other forms of open or disguised import
restriction such as exchange controls [5]. This argument would have more force
if nations in Latin America dealt with their balance of payments problems
through a uniform tariff on imports. Of course this is not the case. A number
of industries are highly protected even relative to the usually high average.
With their own producers eager to retain or increase protection from im-
ports, the industrial nations have been understandably slow to offer unilateral
targeted tariff cuts, and rapid shifts in international comparative advantage in
recent years continue to strengthen protectionist pressures. A quid pro quo in
the form of enhanced export possibilities for the industrial nations could go far
toward shifting the internal political balance on trade policy issues of interest
to Latin America. And, given the region's rapid growth rates, potentially im-
portant reciprocal concessions could in many cases be accommodated without
displacing domestic producers.
Intra-Latin Trade
In light of current protectionist trends in the industrial nations, increasing
attention is now focused upon the prospects for increasing Latin-American ex-
ports to other markets. As already noted, exports to two nontraditional markets
— OPEC and the Soviet Bloc — have grown rapidly in recent years. While254 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
trade policy may have some role to play in determining the future growth of
Latin-American sales in these markets, the critical factor is likely to be the
importers' perceptions of exporters' political independence from the US. By far
the most important alternative market, in terms both of current export levels
and of future growth potential, is Latin America itself. Latin America has
become its own best customer for the manufactured exports essential to export-
led industrial development and, since high tariff and nontariff barriers still
protect most Latin-American markets for manufactured goods, there is con-
siderable scope for enhancing this trend.
Growth of intra-Latin trade could be encouraged either through discrimina-
tory reduction of trade barriers (most likely on a regional basis, where there
is ample precedent of intent, if not achievement) or through MFN reductions.
To the extent that these are viewed as alternative policies to foster export ex-
pansion, an important question is whether export growth resulting from prefer-
ential trading arrangements would yield the same dynamic benefits as trade
increased under MFN access. If dynamic benefits mainly reflect such considera-
tions as scale economies, learning by doing, and increased competition, expanded
trade on a preferential basis within Latin America would have developmental
consequences comparable with those of increased MFN exports. But to the extent
that gains from expanded trade and associated efficiency of new investments
depend upon the neoclassical determinants of comparative advantage — differ-
ences in factor abundance across trading countries — expansion of trade on a
preferential basis would yield smaller benefits than the sa ae growth in MFN
trade [14].
The two options should also be assessed in terms of the domestic and inter-
national politics of trade liberalization. The nations of La*-' . America are likely
to accept deeper cuts in protection within a regional preference scheme than
would be economically or politically acceptable on an MFN basis. Large MFN
cuts would mean direct competition with industrial exports of the advanced
nations. If these suppliers captured major shares of newly' liberalized markets,
the positions of domestic infant industries could be imperiled. But similar con-
siderations also limit the scope of preferential trade agreements among develop-
ing countries that differ significantly in stage of industrial development. The
formation of the Andean Group within LAFTA reflected this concern.
Potential trade benefits to Latin America from preferential agreements in-
clude substantial diversion of trade from excluded suppliers, especially those
in the industrial nations. A further movement toward preferential trade within
Latin America would thus be costly to export interests elsewhere, particularly
to the US, and could exacerbate the protectionist pressures there. In contrast,
a commitment to broad MFN liberalization by nations in Latin America would
be an important lever in future trade negotiations and could be used to obtain
reciprocal concessions from these potential importers.GAINS FROM LIBERALIZATION 255
While these arguments suggest that MFN liberalization is preferable to
further regional integration efforts, the two avenues for market expansion may
be viewed as complements rather than as alternatives. Liberalization on a re-
gional basis might yield sufficient dynamic gains to support eventual reductions
of many MFN barriers. At the same time, an economically integrated Latin
America would also facilitate effective bargaining in future bilateral and multi-
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1. Evidence on export-led growth has been evaluated succinctly by Anne O. Krueger
[14]. For a guide to recent literature on trade policy and development, see [4].
2. John S. Odell [16] has emphasized the political cost to the US of closing do-
mestic markets to exports from Latin America. In some cases, the Department of
State has allied itself with exporting nations opposing such measures as countervailing
duties.
3. William R. Cline [6] has summarized the costs and benefits of proposals made in
recent years. While trade liberalization should improve worldwide economic efficiency,
there is the possibility of adverse terms-of-trade movements and the certainty of short-
run sectoral adjustment problems for the liberalizing countries.
4. Fractions are of otal Latin-American trade, including Caribbean nations, un-
less otherwise indicated. For data sources, see notes to tables.
5. Growth rates computed from nominal export values in World Development
Report, 1979, Table 12
6. On the relative importance of Latin-American nations in the world markets for
individual agricultural exports, see [19].
7. The use of export market shares eliminates most of the effect of business cycles
in the importing count" !es. Total LDC imports, rather than total imports, is used to
reduce the effect of compositional shifts.
8. The effects of the GSP on exports from Latin America are discussed in the
second section of this paper. The various schemes are described briefly in IMF Sur-
vey, 4 July 1977. On the background of the GSP issue, see [15].
9. The LAFTA total is used here because Caribbean exporters may have benefited
from special ties to the EC, as described later.
10. On the Lome Agreement and other EC preferential arrangements potentially
disadvantageous to competing Latin-American exporters, see IMF Survey, 4 July 1977.
Somewhat more restricted preferences were available to a smaller group of nations
under earlier bilateral agreements and the Yaounde Conventions of 1963 and 1969.
11. Over the longer run, regional integration may influence the location of new
investment within the group of member nations, thus spurring growth by increasing
die social return to investment. In the case of LAFTA, there is little evidence that
this has occurred.256 EXPORT DIVERSIFICATION
12. It should be recognized, however, that the MFN principle was already subject
to many major exceptions. See [7].
13. Of course, as long as any protection remains, competition is on unequal terms
with domestic producers in the importing nations.
14. The degree to which this happens depends upon the details of implementation
as well as the competitiveness of the markets in which goods are traded. See [15] on
the EC scheme.
15. In reality, comparative advantage is often supplemented by government export
incentives.
16. Japan and the EC also restrict, through somewhat different means, preferential
access for the group of "troublesome" LDC exports that are already internationally
competitive.
17. In fact, potential opposition to future MFN tariff reductions on the part of
LDCs had been used by some critics of the GSP principle as an argument against
its acceptance by members of the GATT. On the other hand, there is no evidence
that actual Tokyo Round offers of the major nations were in any way influenced by
the possible erosion of GSP benefits.
18. [17]. The OAS estimates are based on a methodology developed by Robert E.
Baldwin and Tracy Murray [3]. Peter J. Ginman, Thomas A. Pugel, and Ingo Walter
[11] assert that this approach leads to systematic understatement of GSP erosion.
Their own estimates indicate a drop in total exports to be the likely outcome.
19. As noted previously with respect to the GSP, so-called trade benefits of MFN
tariff reductions refer to the induced change in total exports to the US market, a
definition that differs from the one usually used in empirical estimates of static gains
from trade liberalization. The Baldwin-Murray approach does not allow for terms-
of-trade gains to exporters.
20. Very rough order-of-magnitude calculations of the net effects of MFN tariff
reductions by the EC and Japan on exports from Latin America were prepared by
the OAS from UNCTAD data for all LDCs as a group. These indicate resulting net
increases in the value of exports to the EC and to Japan of about one-half and one-
third, respectively, the gain in exports to the US. The UNCTAD data do not pro-
vide a country-by-country breakdown of benefits, but it is reasonable to assume sub-
stantial variation across countries, as in the US case.
21. Brazil and Uruguay have been parties to a number of trade disputes with the
US on subsidies to industrial exports [16]. The other countries represented in a num-
ber of disputes — and on that account likely to sign — were Argentina and Mexico.
22. In principle, there could be a conflict between harmonization and the targeting
approach. In the case of advanced nation protection against LDC imports, however,
both point in the same direction.
25. Under the GSP, the margin of preference and, hence, the incentive for export
expansion, will be the same for every country for any given item. However, there is
no reason to believe that the best sectors to lead an export push will be the same in
every country.
24. However, for an import-competing infant industry, fiscal incentives favor per-
petuation.
25. [6]. Asian LDCs account for the largest portion of the aggregate potential gains,
although the benefits to Latin America would also be substantial.
26. The major, and most highly publicized, aspect of this program is the proposed
creation of buffer stocks financed by a "common fund." The implications are dis-
cussed in the paper by J. R. Behrman, F. G. Adams, and M. Lasaga for this con-
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27. One example in Latin America is Brazil's use of an export tax on coffee beans
but not on (processed) soluble coffee.
28. Reduction of barriers to agricultural trade would tend to reduce prices to con-
sumers and producers in the liberalizing countries and raise them in all other markets.
Thus, major OECD liberalization would have important redistributive effects both
internationally, between exporters and importers, and within nations. For Latin
America, aggregate agricultural imports are small relative to exports, so that terms
of trade gains would be experienced for the region. However, prices to consumers of
food and other agricultural commodities would typically be higher, causing regressive
internal redistribution unless offset through other policies.
29. However, Bela Balassa [1] has presented evidence suggesting that this trend
may have been arrested or even reversed since early 1978.
30. In the case of safeguards, no code has been concluded.
31. In fact, some developing nations have found import liberalization a necessary
step in achieving the productive efficiency required to make export industries inter-
nationally competitive. Stronger external pressure to liberalize existing barriers on a
reciprocal basis could thus actually promote development goals by defusing domestic
opposition to necessary trade reforms. This effect appears to have been significant in
the industrial nations.
32. Thomas B. Birnberg [5] calculated that only two nations in Latin America,
Mexico and Brazil, would receive sufficiently large trade benefits from US tariff
liberalization to justify a US request for reciprocal liberalization. Nations in Latin
America that actually made tariff concessions in the Toyko Round included Argen-
tina, Jamaica, Brazil, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Peru, and Uruguay
(IMF Survey, 10 December 1979). This suggests that the benefits of reciprocal bar-
gaining have already begun to be perceived.
33. The history of the European Community provides some support for this opti-
mistic assessment.
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Comment on "Gains to Latin America from Trade
Liberalization in Developed and Developing Nations"
Edmar L. Bacha
PUC/Rio de Janeiro
From a timeless perspective, it is hard to disagree with the general con-
clusion of the paper that Latin America would be better off pressing for MFN
trade concessions than for preferential trading arrangements.
However, the choice is not with Latin America. Current emphasis on export
growth in the region is not geared at accumulating foreign reserves, but
rather at generating foreign exchange to pay for additional imports. Latin-
American trade reciprocity is already implicit in current export drive efforts.
Trade liberalization should advance in Latin America as exports prospects
brighten and the balance of payments improves.GAINS FROM LIBERALIZATION 259
The choice of preferential trading under these conditions will be imposed
on Latin America from the outside. If there is a recession in the industrial
world and/or "new protectionism" goes unabated, Latin-American countries
like European nations in the 1950s will have no alternative but that of trading
among themselves. History teaches that Latin American countries may have
on occasion overreacted to external shocks, but seldom attempted on their
own to isolate themselves from the rest of the world.
McCulloch criticizes past Latin-American attempts to achieve market access
to industrial countries (which are found to be "the markets of the past"),
while neglecting the Soviet Union, OPEC countries, and Latin America itself
(which are identified as "the markets of the future"). But then she goes on
to criticize Latin-American integration efforts and other preferential trading
arrangements. Her proposals for the future are mostly directed towards "the
markets of the past." Her alternatives for new trade-creating arrangements
among Latin-American countries and with the Soviet Union and OPEC
countries are left undefined.
In this context, her proposals sound like a nostalgic return to the GATT
of the 1960s, as Ray Vernon has pointed out. The clock will not turn back,
but history has some lessons to teach. Maybe the time has come to put GATT
and UNCTAD under the same roof, in an updated version of the International
Trade Organization, the constitution of which was aborted by the US Con-
gress in the late 1940s. Freer trade between Latin America and the industrial
world might be less of a dream in an institutional context where other themes
of interest are negotiated, such as stabilization of commodities markets, codes
of technology transfer, codes of conduct for TNCs, and financing procedures for
import dislocation costs.
Last but not least, it is surprising and disappointing to notice that in this
paper one cannot find one single reference to the most discriminatory US trade
policy measure faced by a Latin-American country, namely, the long-standing
American trade embargo against Cuba. Memory falters when the legitimacy of
the powerful is at stake.